If we assume, following Dostoevsky, that not everything is permitted, we may in turn ask whether or not planning is permitted, given that planning is understood as conscious, purposive, and free reconstruction of society. In other words, the very notion of “artificial” history, as distinguished from “natural” history outside human control, implies the possibility, although not the necessity, of a world in which everything is permitted. This possibility is sufficient to contradict our assumption, and vice versa. Less statistically, and also more modestly, the question is whether or not there is a path of social transformation that would realize this possibility without violating Dostoevsky’s premise, that is, by circumventing it. Indeed, there is no a priori reason for rejecting such a path. But, even if we assume its existence, the problem of its desirability remains, in terms of its end—the reconstructed and permissive world. This appears to be the converse, or at least a special case, of the old means-ends puzzle: not everything is permitted in seeking after the world in which everything is permitted. The problem is that, the justified means notwithstanding, this particular end eludes every attempt at justification. It eludes all ethical considerations. The very puzzle is transcended.